RDX : 啥叫流氓國家？ 這就是
by Bruce Klingner
Posted Sept. 5, 2008
The six-party talks have hit yet another speed bump on the road to North Korean denuclearization. The negotiations are deadlocked once again due to Pyongyang’s refusal to fulfill its agreed-upon commitments. North Korea’s rejecting the verification protocol that Washington stipulates is a prerequisite for removing North Korea from the United States’ list of state sponsors of terrorism. Pyongyang is seeking to minimize the intrusiveness of any inspection requirements, as it did in the 1994 Agreed Framework.
North Korea claims the gridlock is due to U.S. failure to fulfill its pledge to remove North Korea from the terrorist list after the mandatory 45-day notification period to Congress, which ended on Aug. 11. None of the Six-Party Talks joint statements, however, commit the U.S. to any deadline for removing North Korea from the list. Indeed, Phase Two—which requires the declaration and disablement of North Korea’s nuclear-weapons programs—only requires the U.S. to begin the process of removing the designation of North Korea as a state-sponsor of terrorism.
Lost in these accusations and counter-accusations is the realization that U.S. President George W. Bush’s new-found willingness—some would say overeagerness—to engage Pyongyang will fail to achieve denuclearization before he departs office. More troubling for the next U.S. president, however, is a growing sense that Pyongyang’s obstructionist antics are not merely negotiating ploys but are instead designed to achieve international recognition of North Korea as a nuclear power. If that is true, then no magical combination of inducements will compel North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons, and the U.S. and its allies will be faced with even more difficult decisions down the road.
North Korea’s launching of missiles in July 2006 followed by its first nuclear test in October 2006 provoked a strong response from the United Nations and led to a resumption of the Six-Party Talks. The reinvigorated nuclear negotiations produced agreements in February and October of 2007. Rather than striving for a comprehensive arms control-style treaty that delineated explicit requirements, the U.S. decided instead to settle for a series of vaguely worded joint statements. Although designed to induce North Korea to lower its nuclear guard in return for incremental diplomatic and economic benefits, the agreements deferred rather than resolved several contentious issues.
Conspicuously absent from the agreements was any direct reference to North Korea’s covert uranium-based weapons program, despite it having been the catalyst for both sides to abrogate the Agreed Framework in early 2003. The agreements also failed to establish the requirements for data declaration of all nuclear programs, the linkage between benefits and denuclearization steps, and the parameters of the verification regime. What has developed since 2007 is a Potemkin village of U.S. policy: a dichotomy between resolute U.S. statements in public and acquiescence to North Korean demands in private. The pattern became for the U.S. to issue bold and firm pledges, admonish the critics who questioned the agreements, and then capitulate to North Korea while vowing to be firm on the next issue of importance.
Pyongyang provided a data declaration of its nuclear programs six months late on June 26, 2008. Although required to provide a “complete and correct” disclosure, North Korea refused to divulge information on its covert efforts to develop a uranium-based nuclear-weapons program and its nuclear-proliferation activities with other nations. In order to maintain a sense of progress in the negotiations, the Bush administration had agreed, during April 2008 bilateral meetings in Singapore, to an unusual strategy in which the U.S.—rather than Pyongyang—would provide the requisite data on North Korea’s uranium program and proliferation activities. Absolved from having to admit its violation of four previous international agreements, Pyongyang could simply “acknowledge”—rather than take any actions to address—Washington’s concerns. The U.S. also acquiesced to North Korean demands to postpone disclosing the number of its nuclear weapons until a later phase of negotiations. The Singapore agreement contradicted the requirements stipulated in the Six-Party Agreements, the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1718, and the standard U.S. arms-control strategy. It also marked a significant fallback from pledges that the Bush administration made only months earlier.
Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill had testified on Feb. 6, 2008, that “We cannot accept an incomplete or inaccurate declaration ... The [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea] must also address concerns related to any uranium enrichment programs and activities.” In November 2006, President Bush had defined a redline for U.S. action, vowing that “the transfer of nuclear weapons or material by North Korea to states or non-state entities would be considered a grave threat to the [U.S.], and we would hold North Korea fully accountable for the consequences of such action.” Despite resolute statements from the U.S., Pyongyang has faced no consequences for its proliferation actions thus far.
On June 26, 2008, the Bush administration announced its intention to initiate the 45-day Congressional notification process that is required prior to removing a nation from the state sponsors of terrorism list. It justified its intention by citing Pyongyang’s having fulfilled the narrow statutory requirements of not having committed a terrorist act for six months. In contrast, Libya was required to make restitution for its involvement in the Lockerbie terrorist act. Meanwhile, North Korea has not been required to admit its involvement in the 1983 Rangoon and 1987 Korean Airliner bombings. Nor has Pyongyang returned to Japan the remaining members of the Red Army Faction terrorist group, whose return had been a condition for Pyongyang’s removal from the terrorist list.
Pyongyang’s June 26, 2008, delivery of a data declaration regarding its nuclear-weapons programs and the destruction of the cooling tower at the Yongbyon nuclear-reactor facility represent commendable progress. Similarly, North Korea’s delivery of approximately 19,000 pages of Yongbyon’s operating records provided a trove of information that would help the U.S. intelligence community refine its assessments of Pyongyang’s nuclear-weapons inventory. All of these steps represent greater progress than was ever achieved under the 1994 Agreed Framework.
These steps do not, however, constitute complete compliance by North Korea of its data-declaration commitments. Nor will the complete disablement of the Yongbyon facilities constitute completion of Phase Two, since the February 2007 joint statement calls for the disabling of “all nuclear facilities.” North Korea’s refusal to provide full transparency on its nuclear programs raises serious questions about its commitment to fulfill even more difficult requirements in the future. These questions are made all the more worrisome by the demonstrated willingness of the U.S. to lower the bar for North Korean compliance and walk away from its strongest pledges.
The Bush administration indicated in early 2008 that “U.S. action related to the terrorism designation [will] depend on the D.P.R.K.’s fulfillment of its second-phase commitments on providing a complete and correct declaration and disabling its nuclear facilities.” And a senior U.S. official insisted in February 2008 that North Korea would not be allowed to make a sequential declaration—offering some information up front and disclosing the proliferation and uranium enrichment later.
The data declaration was supposed to be the first test of Pyongyang’s willingness to fulfill its obligations. North Korea would have failed this test had the U.S. not graded on a curve. Recently, however, the U.S. has adopted a firmer stance against North Korean recalcitrance. The Bush administration vowed on June 26 to secure a rigorous verification regime capable of preventing North Korea from violating another international agreement. The U.S. conditioned the removal of North Korea from the list on its compliance with “a six-party agreement on an acceptable verification protocol … an acceptable monitoring mechanism, and commencement of verification activities.”
This renewal of principals reflects a trend in which the Bush administration responds to public criticism by re-raising the bar for North Korean compliance. Following initial exposure of the North Korean-Syrian nuclear link, President Bush, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, and Assistant Secretary Hill employed stronger rhetoric in response to a growing chorus of critics accusing the administration of being overzealous in its quest for an agreement. The Bush administration also adopted a firmer line following a backlash from those against the Singapore agreement and seven months of U.S. stonewalling on North Korean proliferation to Syria.
The Six-Party Talks nations agreed on July 12, 2008, to broad measures for verifying North Korea’s pledge to abandon its nuclear weapons programs. The joint communiqué was typically bereft of substantive details, which were deferred to a working group for resolution. North Korea did agree to verification measures that included “visits to facilities, review of documents, interviews with technical personnel and other measures.” But there have been no indications that Pyongyang has accepted any verification requirements other than at the Yongbyon nuclear facilities.
The July 12 communiqué also reveals a disturbingly peripheral role for the International Atomic Energy Agency: “When necessary, the verification mechanism can welcome the IAEA to provide consultancy and assistance for relevant verification.” As such, it conflicts with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1718 as well as North Korea’s September 2005 pledge to return “at an early date, to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards.” The IAEA is the only organization that can certify that Pyongyang has fully complied with its NPT requirements following extensive inspections.
Creating a sufficiently rigorous verification system is not only a key test of Pyongyang’s pledge to abandon its nuclear weapons, it is also the best defense against North Korea’s violation of yet another international nuclear agreement. U.S. technologies, such as imagery satellites, are useful, but they are no substitute for on-site inspections.
The U.S. should not remove North Korea from terrorism list until it accepts a verification regime that specifically covers both its plutonium and its uranium nuclear-weapons programs, and includes the right to conduct short-notice challenge inspections throughout the country. An effective verification protocol must include such details as the number of short-notice challenge inspections of nondeclared sites, the technical inspection equipment allowed, and a requirement that inspectors be transported expeditiously to desired sites. Additionally, the Bush administration should not declare Phase Two of the Six Party Talks successfully completed until North Korea has entirely fulfilled its commitments, namely a “complete declaration of all nuclear programs and [the] disablement of all existing nuclear facilities.” The U.S. must learn from the shortcomings of the 1994 Agreed Framework and prohibit North Korea’s indefinite postponement of required inspections.
Although Washington’s pledge for strong verification is encouraging, past behavior indicates it will be difficult to maintain U.S. resolve. The Bush administration, longing for a foreign policy legacy, will be increasingly tempted to accept Pyongyang’s half-hearted compliance as sufficient justification to continue negotiations. The Bush administration should continue nuclear negotiations with North Korea, but with three critical modifications to its current approach. Washington should insist on complete North Korean compliance with existing denuclearization commitments, require greater specificity in subsequent agreements to clearly delineate North Korean requirements, and implement parallel enforcement measures against Pyongyang’s illegal activities, including counterfeiting, drug running and proliferation.
The magnitude of the dispute between the U.S. and North Korea over the verification protocol will make it more difficult for diplomats to continue papering over differences. All indications are that the Bush administration will, at most, achieve completion of Phase Two of the Six Party Talks—disablement rather than dismantlement of nuclear facilities at Yongbyon. The more critical issue for the next U.S. president is whether North Korea intends to give up its nuclear weapons regardless of the inducements offered. North Korean officials have repeatedly indicated their intention is to achieve international recognition of and acquiescence to North Korea as a nuclear state. President Bush’s successor will inherit a half-completed denuclearization process, and Pyongyang is likely to test the new president early in his administration.
Mr. Klingner is a senior research fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at the Heritage Foundation
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