by Ko Mishima
Posted October 3, 2008
In response to Yasuo Fukuda’s sudden departure, the Liberal Democratic Party held the presidential election on Sept. 22, electing Taro Aso as its new leader. Two days later, the Japanese parliament formally authorized Mr. Aso’s premiership. While the future of Mr. Aso’s cabinet is unclear, there is no doubt that the LDP is suffering a deep organizational decline. Mr. Aso may choose to call a snap election for the lower house soon and, depending on the results, the LDP may lose its ruling position. Moreover, the coming election may begin a new round of party realignment.
Even though its timing was unforeseen, Mr. Fukuda’s resignation itself was not a surprise. It was evident that he reached a deadlock. Japanese society faces many difficult problems, such as increased economic inequality, an aging population, economic disparities between the regions, and unstable financial markets. Mr. Fukuda completely failed to address these and other problems. Why was he so ineffectual? Of course, personal factors—Mr. Fukuda’s lack of vision and political skills, his age, and so on—were partly to blame. Japan’s “twisted parliament” also burdened him. Because of then Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s political blunders, the LDP lost to the Democratic Party of Japan in the upper-house elections in 2007, giving up effective control of the upper house of the Diet. Thus, it became difficult for Mr. Fukuda to pass even noncontroversial bills through parliament.
However, the fundamental reasons for Mr. Fukuda’s failure (and Mr. Abe’s) could be found in structural changes in the LDP’s internal organizations. Specifically, the dominance of second-generation parliamentarians and the weakening of traditional intraparty management systems are damaging the party’s vigor. As a result, the LDP is less sensitive to popular demands and is less capable of leading policy making effectively. During his tenure, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi concealed this fact with his unique charisma. Yet, his departure removed the cover, making the party’s decline visible once again.
Second-generation parliamentarians, or nisei giin, are those who inherited their electoral district from a relative (usually, their father) who had also served as a parliamentarian. They increased in number during the ’70s and ’80s and now account for about 30% of LDP’s lower-house members. Importantly, they almost monopolize LDP leadership—Mr. Aso is one of them, and so were Messrs. Fukuda, Abe and Koizumi.
One problem with second-generation parliamentarians is that their political position relies not on their talent and efforts but on their inherited electoral “machines.” Therefore, many of them have dubious professional capabilities. This point was unmistakably demonstrated by Mr. Abe. Most of his personal followers were second-generation parliamentarians. He deliberately appointed these followers to key positions in his cabinet, which critics nicknamed “the cabinet of buddies.” In reality, though, they were concerned only about individual gains, eventually shortening the life of the Abe administration.
Another problem is that while many second-generation parliamentarians represent rural districts, the LDP’s traditional stronghold, they are ill-informed about the realities of rural communities. In general, they grew up and were educated in Tokyo; as such, they do not have personal networks that allow them to obtain information from the grass roots in their rural districts. Today, the LDP is troubled with defections by rural voters, which happens in part because second-generation parliamentarians failed to build an effective communication pipeline between Tokyo and rural regions. A third problem is that the presence of second-generation parliamentarians among the party’s younger generation leads to reduced pressure for reform. Usually in an organization, young members are an important catalyst of renewal. In the LDP, however, many young members are also second-generation parliamentarians. From the outset of their careers, they have a sense of entitlement and are bound by vested interests.
The LDP’s internal management traditionally stood on two primary pillars: factions and zoku. Yet, both mechanisms began to wane with the 1994 electoral reform of the parliament. Mr. Koizumi’s assaults undermined them further. Consequently, the LDP has come to lack efficient mechanisms that can mobilize and coordinate its parliamentarians, bringing about a reduction in its organizational effectiveness. Factions used to be the cornerstone of the LDP’s internal order. Commanding rank-and-filers at will, factional bosses decided who would become the party’s top leader. They no longer possess such strong power. Indeed, in the presidential election last week, factional affiliation was merely one of many factors that shaped LDP parliamentarians’ behavior. Of the eight factions that currently exit, only four small ones could act in unison. All four big factions failed to speak with one voice. Having consecutively produced four prime ministers prior to Mr. Aso, the strongest Machimura faction is said to preserve traditional patterns best. But this time, it split because Yuriko Koike stood up as the first female candidate in history, defying senior members of the party.
The decline of factions damages the LDP’s organizational strength. First, it makes the LDP prime minister’s position more unstable by depriving him of an important leverage to keep centripetal forces within his party. Before, factions enjoyed total loyalty from their members. This meant that when placed in a predicament, an LDP prime minister could count on at least his faction’s support while waiting for the tide to turn. Today, however, he lacks this luxury. Once he stumbles, his supporting circles instantly evaporate, turning him into a lame duck. Both Messrs. Fukuda and Abe were victims of this dynamic. Second, in the past, only factional bosses were qualified as candidates for the premiership. This meant that only those who held proven records of successful leadership could rise to the top position. Today, however, a candidate whose ability as a leader is unknown may secure the prime-ministerial appointment. In fact, when electing Messrs. Fukuda and Abe as their leader, many LDP parliamentarians were unaware of their lack of leadership capacity.
Tribal parliamentarians, or zoku, are senior and middle-level LDP politicians who specialize in a particular policy area. Equipped with abundant experiences and networks, they traditionally functioned as the nucleus of policy making. They have also seen a major drop in their power. Undoubtedly, the zoku parliamentarians’ demise has pluses. For example, the opposition that they pose to economic reform is now less. But their downfall also has minuses. First, the zoku parliamentarians are the LDP’s primary point of contact with interest groups, so their weakening reduces inputs from the latter. In turn, the LDP has to depend more on the bureaucracy for information and becomes susceptible to bureaucratic manipulation. Second, zoku parliamentarians are an important communication channel between rank-and-filers and party executives. Thus, their decline makes it harder for information at the grass-roots level to reach party leaders.
Surely, the weakening of such traditional systems as factions and zoku could work as the trigger for organizational renewal by giving reform-minded members more space for action. Yet, the LDP’s potential reformers have failed to grab this chance. Most notably, the so-called “Koizumi Children” have completely failed to affect the LDP’s internal politics. The Children are those who won their first victory in the 2005 lower-house election under Mr. Koizumi’s leadership. They number 83, accounting for about 20% of the LDP’s total. Influenced by Mr. Koizumi’s reform philosophy, their orientations tend to differ from traditional LDP politicians. Most come from urban districts and keep the party’s traditional support groups at a distance. Three years ago, many analysts predicted that the Children would become a major driving force for party reform. Yet, this prediction has never been fulfilled. Many of them are seen as unlikely to be re-elected in the next election. Therefore, the rest of the LDP treat them as unviable forces and marginalize them.
No doubt the LDP will have a tough fight in the coming election. The voters’ discontent about it runs deep. The truly important question is if the LDP will be outperformed by the DPJ and give up the ruling position to the latter. Before Mr. Fukuda’s resignation, the polls suggested the LDP’s likely slaughter. But with Mr. Aso’s inauguration, the LDP’s unpopularity seems to be bottoming out. Still, we cannot underestimate the chances for a loss by the LDP.
Finally, it is notable that whether the LDP or the DPJ will win the coming election, a reshuffling of parties may happen in its aftermath. If the DPJ wins, both parties will be exposed to pressures for organizational split. The DPJ also has internal divisions over its orientation. Responsibility for governmental decision-making may highlight these cleavages and break the party’s unity. In fact, it is rumored that DPJ leader Ichiro Ozawa is preparing a realignment plan that will involve both the DPJ and LDP.
As in the DPJ, there exists a broad range of policy opinions in the LDP. It is never an exaggeration to say that only the government spoils can bind together a diverse set of LDP parliamentarians. Without them, the party may dissolve readily. It will be no wonder if desperate LDP members think that the easiest way for them to return to power is to create a new majority party with like-minded DPJ members. Behind the scenes, some LDP politicians are discussing plans to launch a new party under Mr. Koizumi’s leadership. It is unclear what Mr. Koizumi’s recent announcement that he will retire from politics means. While the return of Mr. Koizumi’s premiership is unlikely, the option of a Koizumi-sponsored new party cannot be excluded.
In the long-term, party realignment is obviously desirable. The current Japanese parties fail to perform their proper function, namely, enabling voters to give directions to policy making. To create a working party system in Japan, the reshuffling of parties is necessary. However, we also need to ask if now is the right time to do it. As the global economy is enveloped by an unprecedented degree of uncertainty, Japan must avoid a political vacuum. At present, party realignment is too risky. Instead, Japanese politicians should adopt a gradualist approach.
Ko Mishima is assistant professor of political science at East Stroudsburg University, Pennsylvania.
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